opendns.comDNS health report
Testing every nameserver. This takes a few seconds.
Testing every nameserver. This takes a few seconds.
Failures and warnings, most serious first, each with what to do.
The record ends in ?all: it lists servers but does not ask receivers to distrust the rest.
How to fix: Replace ?all with ~all or -all.
The record uses the ptr mechanism, which the SPF standard tells senders not to use: it is slow, and some receivers skip it.
How to fix: Replace ptr with the ip4/ip6 addresses or an include of the servers it was meant to cover.
The policy is p=none: receivers send reports but still deliver mail that fails the checks, so the domain is not yet protected against forged mail.
How to fix: Read the reports until every service that sends for you passes, then move to p=quarantine and finally p=reject.
Some DKIM keys are 1024-bit RSA. They still verify, but are considered weak.
How to fix: Create a 2048-bit key at the mail provider that uses the selector and publish it in place of the old one.
The .com zone lists 3 nameservers for opendns.com.
3 nameservers are listed. At least two are required.
Every nameserver that needs a glue record has one.
Every nameserver name resolves to an address.
All 4 nameserver addresses answered over UDP.
All reachable nameservers answered over TCP.
Every reachable nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
The NS records at the parent and in the zone match.
No nameserver offers recursion to the public.
The zone's SOA record.
All nameservers have serial 1795034925.
The primary nameserver auth1.opendns.com is one of the listed nameservers.
Refresh is 16384 s (4.6 hours), within the usual range.
The domain has 3 MX records.
All nameservers return the same MX records.
Every mail server resolves to an address.
No MX record points to a CNAME.
Every mail server address has a reverse DNS record.
The record ends in ?all: it lists servers but does not ask receivers to distrust the rest.
How to fix: Replace ?all with ~all or -all.
The record uses the ptr mechanism, which the SPF standard tells senders not to use: it is slow, and some receivers skip it.
How to fix: Replace ptr with the ip4/ip6 addresses or an include of the servers it was meant to cover.
The policy is p=none: receivers send reports but still deliver mail that fails the checks, so the domain is not yet protected against forged mail.
How to fix: Read the reports until every service that sends for you passes, then move to p=quarantine and finally p=reject.
www.opendns.com resolves.
opendns.com resolves.
The website has no AAAA record, so it is reachable over IPv4 only.
Report generated in 900 ms.
The domain is reachable over IPv6, but some nameservers are IPv4-only.
No DS record at the parent zone. The domain is not signed with DNSSEC.
No nameserver reveals its software version.
Nameservers are spread over 2 IPv4 networks.
Retry is 2048 s (34 minutes), within the usual range.
Expire is 1048576 s (12.1 days), outside the usual range of 2 to 4 weeks. This matters only if your secondary nameservers copy the zone with zone transfers.
Minimum (negative cache TTL) is 2560 s (42 minutes), within the usual range.
Some DKIM keys are 1024-bit RSA. They still verify, but are considered weak.
How to fix: Create a 2048-bit key at the mail provider that uses the selector and publish it in place of the old one.
The domain has one SPF record.
Checking this record takes 7 of the 10 DNS lookups a receiver allows, includes within includes counted.
The domain has a DMARC record.
Receivers send aggregate reports to the address in the rua tag.