ietf.orgDNS health report
Testing every nameserver. This takes a few seconds.
Testing every nameserver. This takes a few seconds.
Failures and warnings, most serious first, each with what to do.
Some MX records point to a CNAME. RFC 2181 forbids this and some mail servers will refuse to deliver.
How to fix: Point the MX record directly to a name with A/AAAA records.
Some nameservers reveal their software version, which helps attackers pick exploits.
How to fix: Hide the version string (in BIND: version "none"; in the options block).
The policy is p=none: receivers send reports but still deliver mail that fails the checks, so the domain is not yet protected against forged mail.
How to fix: Read the reports until every service that sends for you passes, then move to p=quarantine and finally p=reject.
Some DKIM keys are 1024-bit RSA. They still verify, but are considered weak.
How to fix: Create a 2048-bit key at the mail provider that uses the selector and publish it in place of the old one.
The .org zone lists 2 nameservers for ietf.org.
2 nameservers are listed. At least two are required.
Every nameserver that needs a glue record has one.
Every nameserver name resolves to an address.
Some nameservers reveal their software version, which helps attackers pick exploits.
How to fix: Hide the version string (in BIND: version "none"; in the options block).
All 12 nameserver addresses answered over UDP.
The zone's SOA record.
All nameservers have serial 2420491805.
The primary nameserver jill.ns.cloudflare.com is one of the listed nameservers.
Refresh is 10000 s (2.8 hours), within the usual range.
Some MX records point to a CNAME. RFC 2181 forbids this and some mail servers will refuse to deliver.
How to fix: Point the MX record directly to a name with A/AAAA records.
The domain has 1 MX record.
All nameservers return the same MX records.
Every mail server resolves to an address.
The policy is p=none: receivers send reports but still deliver mail that fails the checks, so the domain is not yet protected against forged mail.
How to fix: Read the reports until every service that sends for you passes, then move to p=quarantine and finally p=reject.
Some DKIM keys are 1024-bit RSA. They still verify, but are considered weak.
How to fix: Create a 2048-bit key at the mail provider that uses the selector and publish it in place of the old one.
The domain has one SPF record.
www.ietf.org resolves.
ietf.org resolves.
The website has an AAAA record and is reachable over IPv6.
Report generated in 311 ms.
Every nameserver has an IPv6 address.
The parent zone publishes a DS record, so DNSSEC is enabled for this domain.
All reachable nameservers answered over TCP.
Every reachable nameserver answers authoritatively for the zone.
The NS records at the parent and in the zone match.
No nameserver offers recursion to the public.
Nameservers are spread over 6 IPv4 networks.
Retry is 2400 s (40 minutes), within the usual range.
Expire is 604800 s (7 days), outside the usual range of 2 to 4 weeks. This matters only if your secondary nameservers copy the zone with zone transfers.
Minimum (negative cache TTL) is 1800 s (30 minutes), within the usual range.
Some mail server addresses have no reverse DNS record. Receiving works without it, but if the same hosts also send mail, many receivers will reject it.
How to fix: If these hosts send mail, ask the owner of the IP address (your hosting provider) to set a PTR record.
There is a single MX record. That is fine if the host is itself redundant; senders retry for several days anyway.
Checking this record takes 2 of the 10 DNS lookups a receiver allows, includes within includes counted.
Mail from servers the record does not list fails SPF (~all).
The domain has a DMARC record.
Receivers send aggregate reports to the address in the rua tag.